Information and the War on Terrorism:
Issues and Opportunities

By Dr. Bruce W. Dearstyne

Dr. Bruce W. Dearstyne is a professor at the College of Information Studies at the University of Maryland.

Information Comes to the Forefront

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have led to many profound changes in our nation, including a new level of attention for the role of information in business, national security, and fighting terrorism. In the aftermath of the attacks, it became clear that better gathering, sharing, and analysis of key information might have enabled authorities to anticipate what was coming.

The most glaring vulnerability exposed by the attacks, said Harvard's Rosabeth Moss Kanter, was "our government's ability to absorb and process information."

Others agreed.

"Informationmostly the knitting together and analysis of informationis clearly what failed us. Too many pieces that might have been useful as a fabric floated here and there, disconnected, a rubble of incomplete knowledge," said Darwin magazine's Editor Lew McCreary.

"[This] is a war in which information may be the most important asset that we have," said National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.¹

We, as information professionals, need to react, lead, and change our strategies to address threats and opportunities. "This is a moment to seize," said British Prime Minister Tony Blair. "The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder this world around us."²

Terrorists' Exploitation of Information

The terrorists understood the value of systematic gathering and analysis of information for their deadly acts. A captured Al Qaeda training manual stressed "gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the neighbors;" disseminating false information ("spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy"); carrying false identity cards, passports, and other documents; and deliberate but cautious use of modern information systems ("duration of transmission [on facsimile and wireless] should not exceed five minutes in order to prevent the enemy from pinpointing the device location").³ They communicated over the Internet, exploited lax United States requirements to obtain key documents (such as visas and social security cards), carefully moved funds through special banks known as hawalas (that are not closely regulated and create few records), and coordinated so thoroughly that each of the four hijacking teams had its own ATM card with a single PIN.⁴

Information as Evidence

The federal government has focused extraordinary time and resources on investigation, intelligence gathering, analysis, selection, interpretation, and presentation of information to the public. The "White House Coalition Information Center" was established to communicate information about war, build support in Muslim nations, and disseminate information about humanitarian aid and plans for establishing a representative government in Afghanistan. Al-Jazerra, the Arab world's news broadcasting network based in Quatar, also assumed an important role in getting information out about the war, America's role, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Taliban. Part of the information challenge was convincing the Islamic public that Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network were responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks. This included offering evidence that the hijackers were connected to Al Qaeda, quoting Bid Laden's videos and speeches, showing that he had the will and the resources to execute an attack of that magnitude, and tying him to the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁵ As the war continued, gathering evidence to try terrorists in special military tribunals became an important consideration.

Managing Information Dissemination

The administration continues to grapple with how to manage and when to release information. In some ways this has been an improvised policy with some inconsistencies and problems. For instance, on October 25, the president's press secretary said that the mail is "overwhelmingly presumed to be safe" from anthrax. However, the postmaster general said, "I can't offer a guarantee" that the mail is safe.⁶

The attorney general or the homeland security director are issuing a number of unspecific alerts based on "credible information" about new terrorist attacks. Some people think this policy is prudent, while others think it is alarmist. The federal and some state governments, reversing long-established liberal information dissemination policies, removed information about water resources, nuclear power plants and waste storage sites, toxic waste sites, and transportation networks from Web sites. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission shut down its site, then reopened it after removing sensitive information.⁷

The Critical Role of Bioterrorism Information

The spread of anthrax through the mail raised issues about sharing information within the public health and medical communities and dissemination of health-related information to an anxious public. The anthrax threat highlighted many information-related issuesabout 20 percent of local public health departments lacked Internet access, 10 percent had no e-mail, consistent and reliable information was hard to find, health "hotlines" were deluged with calls and staffed by people who did not have answers, and the message about the seriousness of the threat was inconsistent.⁸ Federal agenciesparticularly Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control, and the Postal Servicestruggled to find the proper amount of information to release and correct tone to release it in. The news media played a major (sometimes alarmist) role in information dissemination. Many health agencies, universities, libraries, and other institutions entered the information-dissemination aspect of the campaign by posting information on their Web sites. The American Medical Association's site answered "Frequently Asked Questions" about bioterrorism, anthrax, and smallpox; provided advice; and offered a Bioterrorism Agents Quick Reference Guide with information about systems, treatment, and the danger of various biological threats.⁹

Improving and Coordinating Information Gathering and Use

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, press accounts and debates in Congress demonstrated inadequate intelligence gathering and information-sharing among the CIA, FBI, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and local police agencies. Lack of communication, turf issues, incompatible and, in some cases, outdated computer and electronic information systems, and lack of ability to deal with information overload presented major information problems. "We would be a lot safer," Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge said, "If we could not only fuse some of this capacity but [also] exchange some of the intelligence that these agencies now get."¹⁰

Key federal agencies began to address the cultural, legal, and technical issues associated with data integration and to earnestly search for ways to "share information on an unprecedented scale."¹¹ Policy analysts also looked at the issue of "too much information" (something that information professionals deal with every day) and how to glean needed information from this overload. The FBI was completely reorganized to put more emphasis on internal security, counter-terrorism, and cyber crime areas, which required more vigorous approaches to information gathering, analysis, sharing, and use.

Increasing the Government's Information Gathering Ability

In the wake of the attacks, FBI agents and other law-enforcement officials stepped up their efforts to track down terrorists and prevent threats. FBI agents showed up unannounced at banks and businesses and asked for information without necessarily having subpoenas, court orders, or warrants. Legal experts advised companies to treat information requests from government agents on their own merits and to have an individual in the company prepared to evaluate those requests.¹²

In October, Congress passed the "U.S.A. Patriot Act," a law, which "lays the foundation for a domestic intelligence-gathering system of unprecedented scale and technological prowess, according to both supporters and critics of the legislation." The law expands the powers of the FBI, CIA, and Treasury Department; expands the use of wiretaps and other investigative/information gathering approaches; guarantees that information can be shared between federal security agencies; and authorizes a nationwide communications system for sharing information with local police agencies. Information sharing barriers are reduced. For instance, the law permits the FBI to give grand jury information to the CIA without a court order, provided the information concerns foreign intelligence or international terrorism.¹³ The Patriot Act seems bound to foster a dramatic upsurge in information-related work.

Information's Role in "Netwar"

Strategists from both the military and other sectors are drawing on theories of management and organization to engage in what military analyst John Arquilla has called "netwar"warfare against a networked force (such as Al Qaeda) where "robustness, speed, and flexibility" count, and "communication is multi-directional, command is shared, people are multi-skilled, trust is high." Defeating a networked adversary involves searching for "nodes" (people or locations that are communication/information switching points). This requires mining human and other intelligence and searching through phone and bank records, visa and immigration data, licenses for transporting hazardous materials, etc. Netwar experts argue that we must look at several dimensions of the enemy: technological (target their processes and technology); social (kinship, marriage, religion that binds the network together); narrative (the story the network tells itself to maintain its esprit d'corps and resolve); organizational structure and mode of operation. Fast-moving assault units with information access complete the picture. Pentagon planners call their version of this approach "network-centric warfare" with three dimensions: a "sensor grid" that collects information; a "shooter grid" consisting of ships, planes, and soldiers; and an "information grid" of computers and communications devices. The goal is to have "information superiority" and fast responsiveness.¹⁴

Information and Battlefield Advantage

Information is playing a major role in the combat aspects of the war on terrorism. The success of American bombing of the Taliban is partially attributable to "gigabytes of targeting information, gathered on the ground, in the air, and from space."

Air Force Chief of Staff John P. Jumper says that "a constellation of information-gathering systems" has provided a dramatic advantage. For instance, unmanned Predator drone reconnaissance planes use their laser designators to point out targets and forces on the ground and give satellite-guided coordinates to Navy and Air Force pilots.¹⁵ Some troops carry Palm Pilots and others use hand-held information devices. There are even plans under way to make more sophisticated information technology available to soldiers on the battlefield.¹⁶

Information Security

In the wake of September 11, the business press has stressed the need for sound information technology security, backup/off-site data systems, and the protection of corporate information systems against the threat of terrorist attacks, including "cyber-attacks" over the Web. Articles about disaster management, business continuity, access control, and related topicsmost having important information management applicationsappeared in policy journals. A special issue of the magazine Information Week covered corporate recovery from the Sept. 11 attacks. The theme of the issue "Relocated, Rewired, Resilient"summed up the generally successful response and lessons learned in the process.¹⁷ New York's hard-hit financial community provided many important lessons, particularly about information issues associated with physical relocation to new offices. Among the themes: redundant information systems are a sound investment to ensure business continuity in times of disruption; morale suffers even if technology and data survive; a realistic disaster preparedness/response plan with clearly assigned responsibilities is essential; and reassuring your customers that their data and your ability to do business are both intact is essential.

Ascent of E-mail, Teleconferencing, E-commerce?

The anthrax scare and fears about flying have given a boost to alternative means of conveying information.

Fear of anthrax-tainted mail is leading some companies and consumers to shun snail mail in favor of e-mail and e-commerce. That has put pressure on IT managers to increase bandwidth, add servers, and deploy applications that can handle the growing volume of e-marketing campaigns and e-payments. ¹⁸

Though meeting via a teleconference hookup may be less personal, it is less nerve-racking than flying to meet your colleagues and business partners. E-commerceperforming business functions over the Web is also likely to get more attention because of recent events. It is too early to predict just what the results will be, but there is no doubt that the terrorist attacks have encouraged greater use of digital information sharing.

Documenting the Attacks

There are also a number of projects aiming to capture information on the tragic events of September 11. The Library of Congress, the Internet Archive, and a few other groups have teamed up to create a Web site that "archives" Web content from the press, government, corporations, and other groups pertaining to the attacks.¹⁹ Several repositories in New York City and elsewhere in New York state have begun documentation efforts to provide a full record of the many aspects and ramifications of the tragedy.

Information and the War on Terrorism: Information Professionals' Roles

Themes like strategic use of information, competitive intelligence, knowledge management, information security, human-computer interaction, filtering, and information policy are not new to information professionals. Here are just a few of the ways information professionals can help in a post-September 11 world:

· We have developed the tools and expertise to meet many of the information-related challenges. Part of the work is to make them better known, understood, and used, particularly in government.

· Our professional community has a role to play in preventing future attacks by helping the government make better use of information and in shaping critical policy choices in sensitive areas such as access to information (including information on library users).

· Libraries have an important role to play for the communities they serve as sources of information for the public, forums for discussions, repositories for documentation efforts, and places of refuge and rallying points in times of crisis.

· Professional library and information schools also have a role to play through offering courses on information and the war on terrorism, competitive intelligence, information policy, and other important current topics.

In the final analysis, it is clear the pieces of the information "kaleidoscope" have indeed been shaken by the tragic events of the past few months. What form they take in the future is in part up to us.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, "The End of the End of Big Government," Business 2.0, December 2001, 40; Lew McCreary, "A Rubble of Information," Darwin, November 2001, 10; Electric Engineering Times, September 24, 2001.

2. Speech to Labour Party Conference, October 4, 2001,

http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.

3. "Al Qaeda Training Manual," http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.html.

4. "Hijackers Built Plot on Brains, Money, Cash," Albany Times-Union, November 4, 2001.

5. "U.S., Britain Step Up War for Public Opinion," Washington Post, November 1, 2001; "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001," http://www.pm.gov.uk/news.asp?newsID=3025.

6. "Ex-Governors Grapple with Wartime Roles," Washington Post, October 29, 2001.

7. "The Post-September 11 Environment: Access to Government Information," http://www.ombwatch.org/info/2001/access.html.

8. George Hardy, M.D., Executive Director, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, remarks at "The Role of Electronic Government in a Changing World," sponsored by the Council for Excellence in Government, Washington, D.C., November 28, 2001.

9. http://www.ama-assn.org.

10. "Border Agencies May be Merged, Ridge Says," Washington Post, November 14, 2001.

11. Rick Whiting and Eric Chabrol, "Safety in Sharing," Information Week, October 8, 2001, 20-22.

12. "Legal Niceties Aside...," Washington Post, November 7, 2001.

13. "Law Allows A Domestic Intelligence Behemoth," Washington Post, November 4, 2001. A helpful section-by-section analysis of the Patriot Act appears on Senator Patrick Leahy's Web site: http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/102401a.html.

14. Thomas A. Stewart, "America's New Secret Weapon," Business 2.0, December 2001, 58-66; "Disconnect the Dots," New York Times, September 17, 2001. For more on "information superiority," see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington: Joint Chiefs, 2000).

15. "Bull's Eye War: Pinpoint Bombing Shifts Role of GI Joe," Washington Post, Dec. 2, 2001.

16. Daintry Duffy, "Information is a Weapon," Darwin, November 2001, 49-54.

17. Sherry Harowitz, "Rebuilding on Security's Sound Foundation," Security Management, November 2001, 42-43. Information Week, October 22, 2001.

18. "Anthrax Scare Gives Boost to E-Commerce," Information Week, October 29, 2001, 30.

19. http://september11.archive.org.